We study data-driven assistants that provide congestion forecasts to users of crowded facilities (roads, cafeterias, etc.), to support coordination between them. Having multiple agents and feedback loops from predictions to outcomes, new problems arise in terms of choosing (1) objective and (2) algorithms for such assistants.
Introduction
Motivation and problem outline: Data-driven computational technology plays an increasing role in our socioeconomic systems, and interesting new questions arise when considering it as part of such multiagent interactions instead of analyzing it in isolation. Here we consider the problem of designing and analyzing central, computational predictive coordination assistants which support coordination between humans in congested facilities via congestion forecasts. In the simplest case, the basic idea is as follows: A predictive assistant provides a forecast A to the users of some facility. The users "trust" A to be a good forecast, and individually optimize their usage of the facility based on it, say their time of arrival, to avoid crowds. Thereby they generate an observable outcome Y , which A is a forecast for. In particular, there is a feedback loop from forecast A to outcome Y .
Versions of such assistants have recently become deployed in the real world: e.g., Google's "Popular Times", which displays the current and general congestion for many public facilities such as swimming pools (not explicitly calling it a forecast though), or France motorway traffic forecasts. (Note that we do not have knowledge about the specific methods these services are based on.)
Outline of approach and main contributions:
• Our first main goal is analyzing to what extent classical prediction accuracy is a sensible objective for the assistant in light of the overall goal of coordination (Objective Clarification Goal). Our first main result is the Objective Characterization Theorem: we establish general conditions under which optimizing prediction accuracy is equivalent to "solving" the coordination problem in an idealized game-theoretic sense -selecting a certain Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE). This applies to both, small-scale and large-scale settings (nonatomic games) , and allows to analyze the utilities experienced by users of the assistant. Our second main theoretical result is the Solution Existence Theorem: existence of an assistant-based "solution" even for the large-scale setting with aggregated information. It uses the Leray-Schauder-Tychonoff fixed point theorem and entails a new BNE existence result.
• Our second goal is designing, analyzing and evaluating data-driven coordination assistant algorithms that pursue prediction accuracy as objective in dynamic settings (Algorithm Design Goal). For the large-scale setting we propose Algorithm 1 together with optimality and convergence guarantees (Proposition 1) under a linear approximative state-space model. We also provide a proof-of-concept Algorithm 2 and convergence guarantees (Proposition 2) for the small-scale setting. We also report positive evaluation of Algorithm 1 in a large-scale real-world experiment (Section 6).
Overview over related work: We give a succinct overview over related work, which is quite broad, alongside sections that contain further details. In game theory (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994) , extensive studies (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008; Roughgarden, 2016) have been conducted on the dynamics and equilibria that arise when several agents repeatedly interact, each trying to learn good decisions from data gathered in the past rounds (Section 5). In some cases -referred to as model-based decision making -agents first build a model/belief about the other agents behavior and then optimize their decision under it. Furthermore, within game theory, the problem of coordination in congested facilities has been studied under the name of congestion games (Nisan et al., 2007 ) (Section 5); settings with many individually negligible agents have been studied under the name of nonatomic games (Schmeidler, 1973 ) (Section 4); the problem of inferring preferences from observing and querying behavior has been studied (Ling et al., 2018; Blum et al., 2014) ; and the origin of beliefs as well as the meaning of the Nash equilibrium has been studied in epistemic game theory (Section 3). The question of whether our assistant makes certain user behavior that we require (instrumentally) rational (Section 3) is remotely related to incentive-compatibility and mechanism/information design (Nisan et al., 2011; Taneva, 2015; Kearns et al., 2014) . Our setting can be seen as a version of model-based decision making mentioned above, where the data-driven modeling task is "outsourced" to the central assistant which in turn influences the behavior of the users. This leads to new possibilities and questions not studied in any of the gametheoretic work we are aware of.
If we fix user behavior, building data-driven assistants can, to some extent, be seen as a specific instance of the multi-armed bandit/reinforcement learning/control problem (Sutton and Barto, 1998) if the assistant has a significant influence, or, if the influence is negligible, as a classical time series forecasting problem (Zhang et al., 2013) often addressed via exponential smoothing and Kalman filtering methods (Hyndman et al., 2008) (Section 4.5) . Maybe most closely related to our work is certain smart cities research (Mareček et al., 2015 (Mareček et al., , 2016 ) that also uses a control approach (Section 4.2). A main difference is that they consider a (single) cost as a function of the joint user action, given a priori, while our objective function (prediction accuracy) allows to take into account (individual) user preferences not known to the assistant a priori (Section 3).
Structure:
• Section 2 contains definitions, model, and problem formulation,
• in Section 3 we analyze the objective in general, • in Section 4 we focus on the large-scale setting, providing algorithms and analysis, • in Section 5 we focus on the small-scale setting,
• Section 6 contains experiments, • and we conclude with Section 7. Proofs are in the appendix.
2 Preliminaries, basic model assumptions, problem formulation Users' decision making problem: There are (time) slots D := {1, . . . , d} in one or several facilities. There is a set N of types of users equipped with σ-algebra N . In the small-scale setting in Section 5, and for simplicity also in the current section, we will interpret N as set of users though. Each i ∈ N observes his private signal Θ i , has to choose an action C i ∈ D (a slot), and, if the collective choice is C = (C i ) i∈N , experiences utility U i =Ū i (X, C), for utility function U i and X some (latent) state.
Assistant-based system: Let us now introduce our main setup where the action C i of user i ∈ N is based on a forecast announced by a central assistant, i.e., where some (inference) parts of the decision making are "outsourced" to the assistant. Specifically, there is an assistant that has covariate W as input, and outputs a (usually probabilistic) forecast A = π(W ), based on policy π. User i ∈ N uses this as an input to her behavior policy σ i , i.e., C i = σ i (Θ i , A).
Let Y denote what is observed about the users' behavior by the assistant, i.e., Y = f Y (X, C), for some function f Y . Let L be the loss incurred by the assistant (specified below). Now our model of the assistantbased (one stage) system M consist of a distribution P M (X, W, Θ i ), where Θ = (Θ i ) i∈N , together with all the above (measurable) equations, as well as ranges range V and σ-algebras σ-alg V for all the above (tuples) of variables V . Figure 1 is the corresponding (causal) Bayes net.
Utility-assistable, assistant-trusting: Let us define certain forms of utility functions and behavior that makes users amenable to coordination assistance. If i's utility function has the form
) does not depend on c i , for all i, c, x, then we call him utility-assistable. And if, in the assistant-free system M (recall that usually we assume A = a to be a distribution over Y ),
we call him assistant-trusting (and best-responding).
Assistant-free game: As a helpful baseline, we also consider an idealized scenario where users' decision making is based on their own inference and full (instrumental) rationality -the following incomplete information (Bayesian) assistant-free game G: The set of players (or types of players) is N .
• utility U i generated by utility functionŪ i : range X × range C → R (this function is common knowledge), • and action C i ∈ D. The common "objective" prior is the "true" P M (X, W, Θ).
Nash equilibrium: Let us now introduce a central game-theoretic concept for "optimaly solving" the decision problem that the game G poses. It will help us characterize the actual utilities that users can gain from using the assistant. A strategy profile s is s = (s i ) i∈N with
and we call it (essentially) strict if the argmax is unique for (almost) all θ i , w.
Goals
Roughly speaking, we aim at designing assistant's policies π that support coordination between the users i ∈ N . Since this task itself is hard to make rigorous, we consider the following two rigorous, quantitative objectives as "proxy" objectives:
e., (probabilisitc) predicition accuracy, with d(·, ·) some arbitrary but fixed statistical distance which is 0 iff both distributions coincide (if L Pred π = 0 we call π a self-fulfilling prophecy);
• L Nash π := 0 if s π is a BNE of the assistant-free game G and 1 otherwise, with s π defined by
i.e., achieving outcomes/utilities comparable to a BNE of the idealized assistant-free game G (selection of a (B)NE is a well-established formulation of the coordination problem in game theory (Nisan et al., 2007) ).
We will, loosely speaking, call assistant policies π that try to optimize L Pred π predictive (coordination) assistants. Now we can precisely state our two main goals. Goal 1 (Objective Clarification Goal). Understand the potentials and limitations of choosing prediction accuracy L Pred as objective for the assistant: What utilities does it imply for users of the assistant? Goal 2 (Algorithm Design Goal). Design algorithms for the assistant's policy π that optimize prediction accuracy L Pred (and L Nash ) based on past data.
3 General setting: characterization of the prediction accuracy objective
Here we address the Objective Clarification Goal on a general level. Note that, instead of making a statement about the reasonableness of L Pred in isolation, which is impossible, rather here we analyze the combination (L Pred , σ), for a certain joint user behavior σ = (σ i ) i∈N . Theorem 1 (Objective Characterization Theorem). Let all users i ∈ N be utility-assistable (Eq. 1) and, in the assistant-free system M , assistant-trusting (Eq. 2), and, in M , with any π, σ,
• If prediction accuracy L Pred π = 0, then the strategy profile s π (Eq. 4) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) of the assistant-free game G.
• Conversely, if the strategy profile s is a strict BNE of the assistant-free game G, then prediction accuracy L Pred πs = 0, where π s (w) := P G,s (Y |w) for all w.
Interpretation of Theorem 1 and remarks:
• Addressing the Objective Clarification Goal: The direct interpretation of Theorem 1 is that the users' utilities that arise from using a predictive coordination are -if the assistant achieves absolutely optimal prediction accuracy -comparable to those of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the game where there is no assistant and everyone would infer the "objective prior" themselves. So, under the stated conditions, predictive assistants can achieve outcomes comparable to the assistant-free game (in particular, it serves as a mechanism for equilibrium selection if there are several) -but at a significantly lower cost, since the inference task is centrally done by the assistant instead of every user building their own model. -That is, if we assume users to be boundedly rational, in the sense that costs for each of them coming up with (Bayesian) models and predictions about other users (from past raw data) would be significant. Otherwise, in case of unbounded inference capacity of users, central tasks addressed by a predictive assistant would be superfluous -raw data W could simply be provided to users directly. Note that one of the main advantages of predictive assistant-based coordination is that prediction accuracy is a simple and easily measurable objective.
• Furthermore, Theorem 1 makes predictive assistantbased settings amenable to all the theory on (Bayesian) Nash equilibria. In particular, this helps in terms of conditions for the existence of (exact) self-fulfilling prophecies, but also allows to point out limitations of predictive assistants based on the price of anarchy (Roughgarden, 2005; Nisan et al., 2007) . (The disadvantage of "ideal", legitimate social choices -the basis of the price of anarchy -is that they are hard to pick in the first place and difficult to infer and measure/validate from incomplete information.)
• Note that, besides the price of anarchy, further limitations can occur when extending the setting: for instance it could happen that the assistant would figure out that making users not use the assistant (e.g., by deliberately providing poor forecasts form some time) could yield more predictable outcomes than other strategies (although, based on our results, never as good ones as Nash equilibria) -possibly yielding completely undesired assistant behavior.
• Our assumption of users "blindly" best-responding to the assistant can be seen as consistent with (instrumental) rationality assumptions in the sense that if only considering the asymptotic utility (once the assistant converged), then deviating from this behavior means deviating from a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, based on Proposition 1. Related work for this result: Interpretations of the Nash equilibrium as a self-fulfilling prophecy have been discussed e.g. in epistemic game theory (Pacuit and Roy, 2017; Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995; Spohn, 1982) . But we are not aware of any work which analyzes the specific conditions, in particular in terms of information/utility structure, for a concrete setting where the self-fulfilling prophecy is actually announced by an "external" agent (the assistant). Generally, influential forecasts have been studied, also using fixed-point formulations but for election predictions, e.g., by Simon (1954) . Nisan et al. (2011) analyzed rationality of best-response dynamics.
4 Large-scale setting: objective clarification and dynamic algorithm
Here we address both, both, the Objective Clarification Goal and Algorithm Design Goal, for the following (incompleteinformation nonatomic aggregated) large-scale setting (a special case of the general setting in Section 2).
Setting
We assume N = [0, 1] with the Borel sets as σ-algebra N , and interpret i ∈ N as a type of user with a certain form of utility function and private signal (similar as Kim and Yannelis (1997) . For simplicity, we assume there are only two (time) slots, D = {0, 1}, and that W, Θ are constant. (Regarding D we believe that the results can easily be extended to the general case; regarding W, Θ, additional considerations may be necessary). Note that, while in practice clearly the set of (simultaneous) users and thus also (simultaneous) types of users is finite, having N = [0, 1] can be seen as an approximation with nice theoretical properties to real settings with many users.
Let G large denote the induced assistant-free game G (Section 2.1) for this specific setting. This can be seen as a special case of an incomplete-information nonatomic game, similar to (Kim and Yannelis, 1997) , in particular having both, types and private signals (for each type). (The name "nonatomic" comes from the fact that one considers nonatomic measures on the type space N = [0, 1].) Conditioning on X it is a classical (complete-information) nonatomic game in the sense of e.g. Schmeidler (1973) .
Assumption 1.
• Regarding domains and σ-algebras, let range A be the set of Borel measures on of humans as (instrumentally) rational "selfish" agents w.r.t. exogenously given individual utilities. It is clear though, that this captures just one aspect of human decision making.
[0, 1], let range X be some topological space with σ-alg X the corresponding Borel σ-algebra, and let range C be the set of {0, 1}-valued Lebesgue-measurable functions on [0, 1] (corresponding to subsets of [0, 1]).
• Regarding users and utilities, let, for all i ∈ N , U i (X, C) =Ũ i (Θ, C i , Y ) and i be assistant-trusting (Eq. 2), picking (w.l.o.g.) slot 0 if both yield the same utility (i.e., as tie-breaking rule). And let (i, y) → U i (Θ i , k, y) be a polynomial in i, y, for all k ∈ D.
• Regarding the observable outcome Y generating mechanism, let there be a continuous family (r(·|x)) x∈range X of densities on (N, N ) and let
The above assumptions mean that the utility of type i only depends on the amount Y k of other types at the slot k that i chooses. The distribution over the types (which is not to be interpreted as a probability -rather as one actual realization) is random, turning it into an incomplete-information setting. Since
, Y is fully parameterized by Y 1 , from now we consider Y to be 1-dimensional and stand for Y 0 . The Objective Characterization Theorem entails the following:
Corollary 1 (Objective characterization for the large-scale setting). In the large-scale setting specified above, let Assumptions 1 hold true. Then:
Existence of self-fulfilling prophecy and Bayesian Nash equilibrium
For this large-scale setting, a key question is: can a forecast that only forecast an aggregate (the Y of Assumptions 1) actually help for coordination? For instance, as observed by Mareček et al. (2016) , if the population of users is completely homogeneous, they will all respond in the same way upon receiving the same input, making coordination impossible. Here is our answer for this question -the second of our two main results:
Theorem 2 (Solution Existence Theorem). In the large-scale setting specified above, let Assumptions 1 hold true. Then there exists an assistant policy π such that prediction accuracy L Pred π = 0.
Corollary 2 (Existence of Bayesian Nash equilibrium). Let Assumptions 1 hold true. Then the assistant-free game G large has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE).
Proof idea and interpretation of Theorem 2 and Corollary 2: The proof (see Section B.2 of the appendix) is based on the Leray-SchauderTychonoff fixed point theorem, harnessing the compactness of the set of Borel measures, range A , under a weak topology. The most important implication of the theorem is the following: it implies that min π L Pred π = 0, and therefore, together with the Objective Characterization Theorem, shows that an assistant that only forecast an aggregate (the Y of Assumptions 1) can nonetheless, when it achieves its optimum, help "solve" the coordination problem -select a BNE. The intuition behind the assumptions is that types and their utility functions have to be diverse. Corollary 2 can be seen as stand-alone, purely gametheoretic result for G large .
Related work for these results: We already mentioned that our setting relates to nonatomic games studied in game theory. However, we are only aware of two lines of work that study the incompleteinformation case in the setting of a nonatomic continuum of types: Sabourian (1990) , but they focus on the relation between equilibria in the one-stage game and the repeated game, and not on existence in the stage game itself. More closely related is (Kim and Yannelis, 1997) : they study existence of a BNE in incompleteinformation nonatomic games in quite general terms. However, they do not cover our case where the "state of the world" (X) has an uncountable range. Furthermore, existence of a self-fulfilling aggregate prophecy is not entailed by their results (using our equivalence in Corollary 1), due to potential non-strictness of their BNE. In this sense, our Corollary 2 may also be of value for the game-theoretic side, although we have to mention again that for now we assumed that the types have no private signals (W, Θ constant). Let us also mention (Rath, 1992) , who, in one part of their proof of their Theorem 1, also reduces the Nash equilibrium existence problem to existence of a form of self-fulfilling prophecy on the aggregate level (without considering it as such). However, they restrict to the complete-information case. Form the smart cities research side, we already mentioned (Mareček et al., 2016 (Mareček et al., , 2015 above. They essentially propose two solutions: either sending different signals to different agents (which we, in a different sense, will also do in the small-scale setting in Section 5) or the population of agents has to be heterogeneous, which relates to our assumption in the current setting. But their heterogeneity is rather in the behavior, not in the form of individually differing utility functions, as in our case.
An instructive linear special case
Let us consider a simple special case of the large-scale setting. On the one hand, this helps provide an intuition for Theorem 2, on the other hand this will justify assumptions we will make in our analysis of our algorithm in Section 4.5. Assume the utilityŨ i (k, y) (we dropped Θ i because it is constant) is linear in i, y for all k ∈ D (making the users risk-neutral). Sõ
x ∈ range X , and P X be the uniform on [δ, 1 − δ]. Then the value of Y given A = a, X = x is, for H the Heaviside function,
First, this shows that under the mentioned assumptions, Y (and its distribution) only depends on the mean
This justifies for the assistant to provide point forecasts under the above assumptions. Second, this justifies a
Introducing the dynamic system
To prepare the algorithm part of the paper, let us introduce a dynamic/repeated extension of the general setting (Section 2). Since we will use this repeated version also in the small-scale setting later on, here we introduce it in its general form, not restricting to the large-scale setting.
Repeated assistant-based system: We define a model M dyn for the assistant-based dynamical system as follows: It consists of N copies of the one-stage assistant-based system M (Section 2) which we call repetitions or stages. We denote variables, say A or L Pred , in the t-th repetition by A t and L t,Pred , t ∈ N, respectively. Furthermore, M dyn contains the following equations that replace/extend the ones of repetition t:
with E t an independent stochastic error term and both functions are assumed to be measurable. The gray, dashed arrows of Figure 1 indicates the dynamic extension. Regarding the assistant's objectives, To prepare for the algorithmic part, let us give two examples of naive dynamic assistant policies that fail.
Example 1 (Naive assistant yields oscillation). Consider a toy scenario of two users, i = 1, 2, two slots, D = {0, 1}, G large a complete-information game (Θ, W, X are constant), and (0, 1) and (1, 0) to be the (deterministic) Nash equilibria. For simplicity, let C directly observed (Y = C), let A be a point forecast. Let the users be assistant-trusting, i.e., at each day t, both users best-respond to A t . The assistant starts with, say, A 0 = (0, 0) and then, naively, each day takes yesterday's outcome C t−1 as forecast for today, A t . It is easy to see that this will lead to an overshooting and oscillating system C 0 = (1, 1), Mareček et al. (2015) ).
Example 2 ("I.i.d." assistant is sub-optimal). Classical forecasting applied to the sequence c 1 , c 2 , ... from the above Example 1 would yield the empirical distribution
t -under some form of i.i.d. assumption. However, the actual best forecast would be a Dirac delta on one of the two Nash equilibria (0, 1) and (1, 0) (due to Theorem 1). In the next section we present an algorithm that does converge against the Nash equilibrium.
Algorithm Expodamp
Let us now turn towards the Algorithm Design Goal for the repeated system M dyn (Section 4.4) in the large-scale setting. Here we let A be a point forecast for Y , i.e., range A = range Y , and consider L t,PointPred π (dynamic version of Eq. 8) as loss function. Recall that in Section 4.3 we gave conditions that justify this simplified approach.
We propose Expodamp as described in Algorithm 1 as the assistant's policy π. The intuition behind Expodamp is that this formula can dampen oscillations in user behavior (Example 1) but it can also accommodate for non-stationarities in user preferences. These intuitions will be made rigorous in the propositions below. Note that the formula in Algorithm 1 is a case of a so-called exponential smoothing method (Hyndman et al., 2008) . However, so far (to the best of our knowledge) it has only be applied to classical forecasts that do not influence the outcome. In a sense, we generalize the established method to this new setting. Output:
Assumption 2. Let the following equations hold for the dynamic assistant-based system M dyn , t ≥ 1:
with E t X , E t Y noise terms that are independent of the past and each other.
Recall that in Section 4.3 we gave conditions that justify the linearity in Assumption 2 (note that the X in Assumption 2 would rather correspond to a parameter of the distribution of X than to X itself in Sections 4.1, 4.3, but we neglect this detail for simplicity of notation). Note that Y t in Assumption 2 can leave [0, 1] in the long run, so, in principle, the model is only appropriate for a limited time span. However, note that, due to convexity, Expodamp will always output A ∈ [0, 1] upon Y ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, for the following proposition, keep in mind that the fixed point (self-fulfilling prophecy) of the linear function a → βa+ γx (ignoring the noise term) is γ(1−β)
−1 x (exists whenever β = 1). In particular, if β = (1 − γ), then the fixed point, i.e., "optimum" for Y , is x.
Proposition 1 (Optimality and convergence rate of Expodamp -restricted version of Propositions 3 and 4 of the appendix). Let Assumption 2 hold true. Let the assistant's policy π be Expodamp (Algorithm 1) with parameter α := (1 − β) −1 for the true β of Eq. 12.
• Stochastic case:
and, in particular, L t,Pred = 0.
• Deterministic case: Assume that X t = x is constant, that β = (1 − γ) and that
That is, Y t converges exponentially with rate γα towards the "optimum" x iff 0 < γα < 2.
Related work for these results: Zhang et al. (2013) apply various machine learning methods to wait time prediction, similar as we do, but not considering influential predictions or non-stationarities. Pick unused a ′′ ∈Ā at random
10 Set a = a ′′ ; Output:
Smyrnakis and Leslie (2010) model multi-agent dynamics using latent-state models, but from the view of one of the players and in a non-aggregate setting.
5 Small-scale setting: objective clarifiaction and dynamic algorithm
In this section we briefly address the Objective Clarification Goal and then focus on the Algorithm Design Goal, for the following (incompleteinformation non-aggregated) small-scale setting (a special case of the general setting in Section 2): N = {1, . . . , n} is finite and we interpret its elements here as users (not types), and the individual actions of the users are directly observed by the assistant, i.e., Y = C = (C i ) i∈N . Let G small denote the induced assistant-free game G (Section 2) for this specific setting. Before turning towards the algorithmic side, we state the following corollary to the Objective Characterization Theorem. Note that, together with classical results on existence of strict BNEs, it entails existence of self-fulfilling prophecies.
Corollary 3 (Objective characterization for the small-scale setting). In the small-scale setting specified above, assume that for all users i ∈ N , they are assistant-trusting (Eq. 2) and that
Let us now consider the repeated system M dyn (Section 4.4) for the current small-scale setting and let us assume X t to be independent of X t−1 , i.e., the special case where each stage is "i.i.d.". We propose a proof-of-concept algorithm for this setting, calling it Partpred. It is sketched -for the case that W is constant -in Algorithm 2, and fully described by the combination of Algorithms 3, 4 (for the congestion game case) and 5 (for the general stochastic case) of the appendix. In one sentence, the idea is as follows: as long as there is (significant) uncertainty about where the optimum (self-fulfilling prophecy/NE) would be, the algorithm tries to make a prediction that is at least partially correct (i.e., makes the correct prediction at least w.r.t. the behavior of one player) -which gives the algorithm its name. The algorithm combine ideas from best-response dynamics, congestion games and potential games (Roughgarden, 2016) with random exploration whenever the best-response dynamics would cycle. Now letĀ be the (finite) set of all distributions P G,s (C) that arise from (deterministic) strategy profiles s of G small . For simplicity, we assumeĀ to be given, but in a next step this could be inferred as well.
Proposition 2 (Convergence of Algorithm 2 -sketch of Proposition 5 of the appendix). Assume there exists a π with L Pred π = 0 (a self-fulfilling prophecy). Let the assistant's policies π r , r ∈ N be given by Algorithm 2, with parameterĀ as defined above. Then, for any ε > 0, there exists R, T such that for all r > R, t > T , it holds that P (L t,Pred πr
Interpretation. The algorithm is mainly a proof-ofconcept to illustrate several points: An assistant can handle simultaneous/imperfectly orchestrated user responses. And while most assistant-free dynamics such as best-response dynamics or ficticious play (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008 ) only converge in special cases, an assistant can help to overcome cycling and oscillations, use exploration, and make the system always converge (with high probability; in the finite setting under consideration). Furthermore, as the congestion game part of Proposition 5 of the appendix will make more clear, the assistant can use prior knowledge of the utility functions, e.g. that they form a congestion game, to speed up convergence, using Algorithm 4 of the appendix.
Experiments: evaluating Expodamp
Here we empirically evaluate Expodamp (Algorithm 1 of the large-scale setting). hours, Y t is 36-dimensional, for all days t. The predictive coordination assistant in this case takes the form of a web app which provides the daily forecast to the whole campus (alongside current queue lengths). The web app is used by roughly between 15 and 45 users per day.Besides Expodamp (with parameters tuned based on a previous purely observational sample), we evaluate the baseline method Average defined by a t+1 := 1 t t s=1 y s , t ≥ 2 (treating y 1:t as purely observational i.i.d. sample). Both, Expodamp and Average are run for T = 35 days as the policy that generates the forecast provided by the web app. As metric, we use the mean squared error
2 . The outcome is in Table 1 , showing that Expodamp outperforms Average in this experiment. For illustration, we also show a two-day sample in Figure 2. 
Conclusions
Recap. We studied data-driven predictive coordination assistants where formulating a sensible objective is a challenge in itself: due to the "multiagent/objective nature" of the problem and the fact that the actual utility functions of the users are hardly known a priori. We chose prediction accuracy objective as a proxy and provided an extensive theoretical analysis of it, in particular that this objective accounts for the actual preferences of the users, but also discussed limiations. We also proposed provably optimal data-driven algorithms for the large-scale, aggregated setting and the small-scale setting. In a large-scale real-world experiment, we positively validated the former. The experiments generally showed that there are clear patterns in user behavior, but also irreducible randomness. The advantage of the aggregated setting is that it allows for stronger data privacy.
Potential next steps. More sophisticated models of users' utilities may help to generalize more from past data beyond our state-space/congestion game model -but extensive search and exploration still seems unavoidable. Our assumption of users always perfectly best responding to the assistant -as key source of information about their utilities -may be relaxed. Generally, more sophisticated user inputs, assistant outputs, intra-day assistant-user interactions and, e.g. ticket systems, could further help coordinate users.
A Proof for Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Claim 1. We have, for all i, θ i and almost all w,
∈ arg max
= arg max
where:
• Eqs. 15, 16 hold by definition (Eq. 4, 2).
• To understand Eq. 17, let us look at what our assumption L Pred π
= 0 implies. Based on its very definition, it implies
for almost all w.
• Eq. 20 follows from our assumption that Z i ⊥ ⊥ Θ i |W in M with any π, σ.
• To understand Eq. 21, observe that, based on Eq. 4,
But C is the only random variable that could change between M π and G with s π . Therefore, all random variables, in particular Z i , coincide between M π and G with s π .
• To understand Eq. 22 note that Z i is defined without C i needing to be defined. Therefore, it is already defined in G with "incomplete strategy profile" [s π ] −i alone.
Generally, note thatŨ i , i ∈ N is integrable, also when we fix some of its arguments (Klenke, 2013, Theorem 14.16 , Eq. 14.6), because we assumed it to be measurable (implicitly referring to the respective product σ-algebra on the individual dimensions).
But Eqs. 14 through 22 mean that for almost no w, θ i , player i ∈ N could improve his utility by deviating from [s π ] i (w, θ i ). Furthermore, we assumed σ, π to be measurable, hence also their composition s π (see Eq. 4) is measurable. Together, this implies that s π is essentially a BNE.
Claim 2. Conversely, if s is a strict BNE of G, then L πs = 0.
Proof of Claim 2. Let s = (s i ) i∈N be a strict BNE of G. That is, for all i, θ i , w,
with the argmax being unique.
First, for the case of the assitant's policy being π s , we have for all i, w, θ i ,
• Eq. 31 follows from our assumption that Z i ⊥ ⊥ Θ i |W in M with any π, σ and thus also in G with any s.
• Eq. 36 follows from how we defined f Zi .
• Eq. 38 follows from how we definedŨ i (Eq. 1).
Since we assumed the above argmax to be unique, we get that for all i, θ i , w,
Second, we have, for all i, w,
• Eq. 42 follows from Eq. 39.
• Eq. 44 is just the definition of π s .
This implies L Pred πs
= 0, which is what had to be shown.
B Proofs for Section 4
B.1 Corollary 1
Proof of Corollary 1. Throughout this proof, let w, θ be arbitrary but fixed.
Part 1: show that general model assumptions of Section 2 are satisfied
Regarding correctness of the range of σ(a, π(w)) (i.e., showing that it ranges within range C = {c ∈ N N : for all k ∈ D, {j ∈ N : c j = k} is measurable }):
is measurable since we assumed
to be measurable (w.r.t. the product σ-algebra) and then we can apply standard arguments involved in Fubini's theorem (more specifically: (Klenke, 2013, Theorem 14.16 , Eq. 14.6)).
We have to show that for θ ∈ range Θ , w ∈ range W , σ(θ, π(w)) = (σ i (θ i , π(w))) i∈N ∈ range C . Equivalently, we have to show that {j ∈ N : σ j (θ j , π(w)) = 0} (47) is measurable. Equivalently, we have to show that the mapping
is measurable (w.r.t. codomain D = {0, 1} equipped with the power set as σ-algebra).
To see this, observe that for all i
But the l.h.s. of the latter equation is a composition (f 0 (i) − max(f 0 (i), f 1 (i))) of measurable functions (recall
) to be measurable) that is measurable again (Klenke, 2013) .
Regarding the measurability of all mechanisms:
Regarding product measurability of (x, c) → f Y (x, c)
We have to show that range Let τ X denote the topology of range X . Let τ L 2 denote the topology of L 2 . Let B τ denote the Borel σ-algebra induced by a topology τ .
Recapture our assumptions:
• σ-alg X = B τX ,
• x → r(·|x) =: r x is continuous from τ X to τ L 2 .
Let τ 1 be the product topology of range X , L 2 and τ 2 be the product topology of L 2 , L 2 .
It follows from our assumptions that the mapping
is continuos w.r.t. source topology τ 1 and target topology τ 2 .
But the L 2 inner product ·, · is continous w.r.t. source topology τ 2 and target topology R. Therefore, the concatenation ·, · • f is continuous from τ 1 to R. Hence it is measurable w.r.t. the Borel σ-algebra B τ1 to the Borel sets on R.
We assumed (range X , τ X ) to be Polish. And L 2 , the space of C, is Polish. Therefore (based on (Klenke, 2013) [Theorem 14.8]), B τ1 , the Borel σ-algebra induced by the product topology on range X , L 2 , coincides with the product σ-algebra σ-alg X ⊗ σ-alg C .
Regarding σ:
W.l.o.g. we can let range A be a singleton. Together with Θ being constant (as with π below), measurability of σ follows.
Regarding π: π is trivially measurable since its inputs are constant by assumption and so w.l.o.g. we can assume π to be a constant function and thus measurable.
Regarding correctness of range A (i.e., that it contains the distribution over Y that is entailed by it): We have to show that P (Y |A = a) ∈ range A for any a ∈ range A . To see this, note that we above showed that x → f Y (x, c) is measurable with σ-alg Y being the Borel σ-algebra on range Y . Therefore the pushforward measure P (Y |A = a) = P (g(X)|A = a), for g(x) = f Y (x, c), is a Borel measure.
Part 2: show that the remaining conditions of the underlying theorem are satisfied Regarding assumption utility-assistability: Let h i simply be the identity. Then, based on our Assumption 1, we haveŪ
and
based on the fact that R x is nonatomic.
Regarding assumption assistant-trusting:
This we assumed explicitly in Assumption 1.
Regarding assumption of independence:
Since we assumed that Θ i is constant for all i ∈ N , it follows trivially that Z i ⊥ ⊥ Θ i |W .
B.2 Theorem 2
Proof for Theorem 2. Since Θ is constant, here, instead ofŪ i (θ, y, k), we will writeŪ i (y, k) for utility of type i when chosing slot k ∈ D given amount of types y (at slot 0).
First we note that for any Borel probability measure µ, the expected proportion of users choosing slot 0 conditioned on X = x with assistant prediction A = µ is
with V (i, y) =Ū i (y, 0) −Ū i (y, 1) and H the Heaviside funciton. Given our measurability assumptions F µ is well defined and measurable, such that the pushforward measure of X by it is also a Borel probability measure.
We will consider the space M 1 ([0, 1]) of Borel probability measures on [0, 1].
, we say that (µ n ) n∈N converges weakly to µ if for any f continuous on [0,1] In order to prove the existence of a fixed point in M 1 ([0, 1]), according to Leray-Schauder-Tychonoff fixed point theorem (Reed and Simon, 1972, p151) , we just need to prove that the mapping
is continuous for the above defined weak topology.
Consider µ k → µ (for this weak topology) we have to show that for any f continuous on [0, 1]
We rewrite the left hand side (using basic change of variable in the Lebesgue integral), assuming P X has a bounded density p X with respect to Lebesgue measure.
Since f is also uniformly continuous on this compact interval, proving uniform convergence on [0, 1] of F µ k to F µ will be enough to conclude. Let us fix an ǫ, we want to bound |F µ k − F µ | with ǫ uniformly over the unit interval. We first note that
Assumptions imply that V is a polynomial in (i, y). Then integrating the quantity inside each H yields two polynomials in i , v(i) and v k (i), of order d, whose coefficients are a linear combination of the moments of µ and µ k respectively, up to some order d ′ . Convergence of µ k to µ thus garanties convergence of the coefficients of v k to those of v, and uniform convergence of the v k to v on the unit interval.
The discontinity of H does not allow us to further use uniform continuity, but we notice that the absolute difference between the two H terms is either zero or one, and is non-zero only on a finite number of intervals where the sign of the v and v k differ. We will thus bound the length of these intervals. For large k, these intervals will be concentrated around the roots of v. We explicitly deal with the case of roots with odd multiplicity (corresponding to zero-crossings), while the case of even multiplicity can be handled in an analog way.
Let (i n ) be all the (finite) collection of zero-crossings of v on the unit interval (this is a subset of all roots of v, excluding roots of even multiplicity), then there exists a η 0 thus that v is strictly monotonous in an η 0 -neighborhood of each i n , and thus admits a familly of continuous local inverse functions v −1 n such that for each n, v
note continuity of the inverse is guarented by continuity and strict monotonicity, while the implicit function theorem does not directly apply at multiple roots due to vanishing of the derivative). Let ǫ 0 be the maximum radius such that the interval [−ǫ 0 , ǫ 0 ] is included in the intersection of the domains of all v −1 n , let us choose N 0 such that |v − v k | < ǫ 0 uniformly on the unit interval, then the Lebesgue measure of I k ǫ0 the union of all intervals such that
n , we can choose ǫ 1 < ǫ 0 and N 1 > N 0 such that λ(I ǫ1 ) < η 1 with η 1 arbitrary small, for k > N 1 . As a consequence, assuming r(i|x) is continuous (and thus bounded) on [0, 1] 2 .
for η 1 arbitrary small. By (uniform) continuity of f , we can choose
This demonstrates that J is continuous for the weak topology, and implies the existence of a fixed point of J in M 1 ([0, 1]) according to the Leray-Schauder-Tychonoff fixed point theorem (Reed and Simon, 1972, p151) .
B.3 Extended version of the proposition and proofs for Section 4.5
Let us state two propositions, that, jointly, generalize Proposition 1.
Proposition 3 (Optimality of Expodamp in stochastic case). Let Assumption 2 hold true. Let π be defined by
for all t ≥ 0 with Q t some function of the covariance structure as detailed in the proof of this proposition. In particular, Q t is such that, if there is no observation noise in the latent-state model, i.e., var(E 0 Y ) = 0, then π coincides with Expodamp (Algorithm 1) when setting α := (1 − β) −1 .
Then, at each stage t,
Proposition 4 (Exponential convergence of Expodamp in deterministic, constant case). Let Assumption 2 hold true. Assume X t is constant, i.e., X t = x, t ≥ 0, for an arbitrary but fixed x, that β = (1 − γ) and that E t X = E t Y = 0. Assume the assistant's policy π is Expodamp (Algorithm 1). Then
Proof of Proposition 3. For Z ∈ {Y, X}, let
Based on the Kalman filter recursive equations (Lütkepohl, 2006, Section 18.3 .1), we havê
for
Note that based on the causal DAG , A t only influences Y t , and no future Y t+k for k > 0. Therefore, π being optimal among all assistant policies is equivalent to showing that each A t π is optimal. So let us show this simpler statement. For this purpose, not that a ∈ arg min
So let π be defined via
Then, on the one hand, based on Eq. 68 and the preceding equivalences,
and, on the other hand, based on Eq. 58
In particular, if there is no observation noise in the latent-state model, i.e., var(E 0 Y ) = 0, then Eq. 60 implies that Q t = γ −1 . Hence, when setting α = (1 − β) −1 we have
which is equivalent to
almost everywhere. But this in turn is equivalent to
for all a, is equivalent to
C Full algorithms, propositions and proofs for Section 5
C.1 Complete algorithms C.2 Complete propositions and proofs
Let us state a proposition that generalizes Proposition 2.
Proposition 5 (Convergence of Algorithm 3). The following holds true:
• General stochastic case: Let, for all w,
s is a (deterministic) strategy profile of the assistant-free game G small }.
(Note thatĀ w is finite since the range of all variables Θ, C is finite.) LetĀ := (Ā w ) w∈range W . Let G small have a strict BNE. Let the assistant's policy π r be Partpred (Ā, r, UpdateFunctionGeneral ) as defined in Algorithm 3 with UpdateFunctionGeneral as defined in Algorithm 5, andĀ as defined above. Then, for any ε > 0, there exists R, T such that for all r > R, t > T , it holds that P (L t,Pred πr
• Directed convergence in in complete-information congestion game case: (Note that a version of this part of the proposition can be formulated where not best, but just improving responses are assumed for the customers, which can even speed up convergence in certain cases.) Let Θ be fully determined by W and for each value of W , let the (complete information) game G small be a congestion game (Roughgarden, 2016) where all NE are strict. For simplicity, in this deterministic setting, assume A ∈ range C (i.e., an action profile instead of (dirac) distributions over action profiles). Let the assistant's policy π r be given by Partpred (Ā, r, UpdateFunctionCongestion) (Algorithm 3) with UpdateFunctionCongestion as defined in Algorithm 4, andĀ = range C the set of all action profiles. Then L t,Pred πr , L t,Nash πr → 0 for t → ∞ without ever invoking lines 14 to 15, i.e., without needing "undirected" search.
Proof for Proposition 5. First part of the proposition: General stochastic case:
Prerequisites.
Let P w,aw := P M (C|W = w, A = a w ). Keep in mind that, as usual, by a fixed point/self-fulfilling prophecy under W = w we mean a w with P w,aw = a w . By assumption, there exists a strict BNE in G small . Then Corollary 3 implies that there is π with 0 = L Pred π = E(d(P M (C|W, A = π(W )), π(W ))). Hence, for each W = w there exists a fixed point. Now let w be arbitrary but fixed. Keep in mind that by a (same-covariate, same-prediction) group (of stages) we mean the subsequence of R stages (t w j ) j where W t = w and A t = a w for some a w ∈Ā w . Furthermore, let us say the algorithm converges at that and that group of stages with covariate w, if after that group of stages it will always output the same a w . Let
Observe that the algorithm certainly converges in finite time -at the latest after sampling has happened r times (corresponding to one group) under all a w ∈Ā w , i.e., after Kr stages. So we have to show that with growing R the probability that the reason for convergence is not that it found an actual fixed point (self-fulfilling prophecy) goes to zero. Observe that in order for it to not converge due to finding an actual fixed point either of the following two events has to happen:
• the algorithm converges at some action that is not a fixed point by wrongly taking it for a fixed point;
• it converges after the K groups of stages by the critereon to force convergence after K (lines 10 to 12), and has missed the actual fixed point (or one of the acutal fixed points).
So it suffices to show for these events individually, that with growing R the probability that they happen goes to zero.
Bound the probability that the algorithm converges at some action that is not a fixed point by wrongly taking it for a fixed point.
Observe that during the phase where the algorithm has not converged yet, each a w ∈Ā w is chosen as action A during at most one group of stages and let us denote the corresponding empirical distribution of C byP w,aw .
The phase where the algorithm has not converged yet consists of at most K groups of stages, and at most K − 1 groups of stages where A is an a w that is not a fixed point. Given any ε, we have to show that there is R, such that for any r > R, we can bound the probability that the algorithm converges due to "wrongly taking a w as a fixed point" at the end any of these groups of stages by ε. We do so by bounding the probability that this happens at any individual group of the at most K − 1 groups where a w is not a fixed point, and then sum them up and apply the union bound.
Let R ∈ N be such that, for all r > R and for all a w ∈Ā w that are used during these most K − 1 groups where a w is not a fixed point:
w,aw for the respective used a w as defined in Algorithm 3. (Such R exists based on the weak law of large numbers Klenke (2013) and the fact thatĀ w is finite.) So let us fix one of these groups of stages where A is an a w that is not a fixed point. In particular, a w = P w,aw . (Keep in mind that nonetheless, P w,aw ∈Ā w .) For all r > R, the probability that the algorithm converges at the end of this group of stages coincides with (or rather: is bounded by) the probability that a w −P r w,aw ≤ P w,aw −P r w,aw . But
To see why the inequality holds true, observe that the event P w,aw −P (To see the first inequality, assume otherwise. Then P w,aw − a w ≤ P w,aw −P r w,aw + a w −P r w,aw < d, which contradicts what we assumed.) So the probablity that the algorithm converges at the end of any of these groups of stages (where A is an a w that is not a fixed point) is bounded by (K − 1) ε K−1 = ε. This is what had to be shown. Bound the probability of convergence of the algorithm after the K groups of stages by the critereon to force convergence after K, and having missed the actual fixed point (or one of the acutal fixed points).
What we have to do here is bound the probability that a fixed point is not taken as a fixed point. Let us be more specific. Given any trajectory of the algorithm with some ordering of the groups of stages, let a w ∈Ā w be a (the first one, if there are several) fixed point, i.e., a w = P w,aw , which is taken as A at some point during the trajectory. Given any ε, we have to show that there is R, such that for any r > R, we can bound the probability that a w is "not recognized as a fixed point" by ε.
Let R ∈ N be such that P ( P w,aw −P r w,aw > d 2 ) < ε for all r > R and for all a w ∈Ā w . (Such R exists based on the weak law of large numbers Klenke (2013) and the fact thatĀ w is finite.) Then for all r > R, the probability that it is not recognized as a fixed point is P a (Since d is the minimum distance between a ′ w and P w,aw -the analogous argument as before.) Finally.
Now simply take R, T large enough such that:
• With high probability, each W = w (with positive probability) has been observed at least KR times.
• Within the event that each W = w (with positive probability) has been observed at least KR times: for r > R, under algorithm π r , the probability that converges against a fixed point occured under all W = w (which is a product of | range W | probabilities that each go to 1 with growing r, based on the above) is high enough.
Second part of the proposition: Directed convergence in complete-information congestion game case:
We write down the proof for the case of a fixed W . The general case works analogously.
Let Φ denote the potential funciton (the bigger the utilities, the bigger the potential function) (Roughgarden, 2016) of the congestion game (and thus potential game) G small .
Let stage t, announcement A t = a and outcome C t = c be arbitrary but fixed. In what follows, we say a set E ⊂ N of players is collision-free if (1) c i = c j for any i, j ∈ E (no two players in E move to the same "target" slot), and (2) a i = a j for any i, j ∈ E (no two players in E move from the same "source" slot). Let us denote a E := (b i : b i = c i if i ∈ E, else b i = a i , i ∈ N ) ∈ C, i.e., applying all moves of players in E to a.
Claim: If E ⊂ F ⊂ N are collision-free, then Φ(a F )≥Φ(a E ). So, roughly speaking, setting A t+1 := a E for any collision-free E, such that no superset F ⊇ E is collision-free, is a reasonable policy for the assistant.
To see why this holds, let c 1 = a, c 2 , . . . , c k = a E be a path from a to a E , meaning that at each step j from c j to c j+1 , only one player i j ∈ E applies her move [c − a] ij to c j .
For the potential function Φ (Roughgarden, 2016) we have
Hence, it suffices to show that u ij (c j+1 ) − u ij (c j ) ≥ 0 for all j, because then we cannot do better than a E by taking a F for any subset F ⊂ E. To prove this, we establish that for all j,
The second inequality directly follows from our assumption that player i j makes an improvement move. To prove the first inequality, we show that for all j,
Keep in mind that in the congestion game, the utility only depends on the number of other players at the same slot.
For each j, based on the assumption that no two players move to the same slot, either the number of other players l = i j at slot c Furthermore, for each j, based on the assumption that no two players move from the same slot, the number of other players l = i j at slot c j ij in action profile c j is the same or it increases compared to c 1 , which implies Inequality 78. This is also the reason why we cannot allow two players to move from the same slot: because it could happen, that the change of cirumstances due to the second one moving renders the move of the first one a worsening move.
Claim: L t,Pred πr
, L t,Nash πr → 0 for t → ∞ without ever invoking lines 14 to 15, i.e., without needing "undirected" search. This is the analogous argument of convergence of classical best-response dynamics in congestion games against a NE (Roughgarden, 2016) : also in our case the Φ is guranteed to strictly increase (with some constant lower
